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EQUITABLE ADOPTION AND THE CONTRACT
TO ADOPT
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of adoption was known to ancient Greece and
Rome,' but was not recognized by the common law of
England. 2  In the United States, adoption exists only by
statute3 with every jurisdiction having some statutory law
on adoption.4  In addition to maintaining such statutes, a
number of jurisdictions agree that all statutory requirements
must be substantially complied with before one will be given
the rights of an adopted child.5 In spite of this demand for
substantial compliance, a number of courts have given
persons the rights of an adopted child although none of
the statutory requirements have been met.6  The courts
refer to this as an "equitable adoption." This doctrine is
usually applied when a contract to adopt has been entered
into between the natural parents and the adoptive parents
or an adoption agency I The contract usually provides that
the adoptive parents take the child into their home, rear
the child as their own, and take the necessary legal steps
required for adoption.8 The child, having lived with the
adoptive parents throughout his childhood, believes that he
has been legally adopted. When these parents die intestate,
the child brings action on the contract to be given the
rights of an adopted child. If the child is given these
rights, he will be able to inherit from the adoptive parents'
estate by the law of intestate succession. It should be noted
1. In Re Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W 249 (1888).
2. Ibid.
3. In Re Johnson's Estate, 98 Cal. 531, 33 Pac. 460 (1893).
4. For a list of state statutes on adoption see LEAVY, LAW OF ADOPTION 93 (2d
Ed. 1954).
5. Willis V. Bell, 86 Ark. 473, 111 S.W 808, 810 (1908) In Re Taggart's
Estate, 190 Cal. 493, 213 Pac. 504 (1923) Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33
Pac. 23, 25 (1893).
6. Benefield v. Faulkner, 248 Ala. 615, 29 So. 2d 1 (1947) Prince v. Prince,
194 Ala. 455, 69 So. 906 (1915) Snuffer v. Westbrook, 134 Kan. 793, 8 P.2d
950 (1932) Kay v. Niehaus, 298 Mo. 201, 249 SW 625 (1923).
7. Kay v. Niehaus, supra note 6, at 626 Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 548
(N.D. 1960).
8. Kay v. Niehaus, supra note 6.
that the child is not actually declared to be a legal heir
of the adoptive parents, but is only given his rights under
the contract. The status decreed exists only in equity 9 The
courts seem to feel that it would be inequitable to allow the
adoptive parents, or those in privity with them, to deny
that the child has been adopted merely because of the
adoptive parents' failure to perform their duty under the
contract. 10  It therefore appears that the purpose of the
doctrine is simply for the protection of the child. This
article is written to consider both theoretical and practical
aspects of equitable adoption and the contract to adopt.
II. THE CONTRACT TO ADOPT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
The action to enforce a contract to adopt is usually
brought in the name of the adopted child since the contract
is for his benefit." The child claiming under the contract
must show adequate proof of the contract. If the agreement
was written and can be brought into evidence, proof is no
problem. If, however, the contract was oral the child must
establish it by clear and convincing evidence.12 A voluntary
change in custody may be a factor in establishing an agree-
ment to adopt. 13 The adoptive parents' conduct towards the
child may also be a factor to consider 14 If the parents have
given the child an education,", changed the child's name
to their own, and represented to their relatives that the
child is their own, the child may introduce these facts in
attempting to prove the agreement. 16  Burdick v Grzm-
shaw,"17 a New Jersey case, made this statement on the
proof needed to establish an oral contract to adopt:
Oral adoption agreements are to be regarded with
grave suspicion when sought to be enforced after the
death of the adoptive parent, and are to be subjected
to close scrutiny and permitted to stand only when
9. Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412, 418 (1949).
10. Drake v. Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S.W.2d 556, 559 (1931)
11. Winne v. Winne, 166 N.Y. 263, 59 N.E. 832 (1901).
12. Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1060 (1931). For cases
holding evidence insufficient to establish an oral contract to adopt, see Kramer
v. Cooper, 347 Ill. 293, 179 N.E. 862 (1932) and Johnston v. Eriksson, 71 S.D.
268, 23 N.W.2d 799 (1946).
13. Burdick v. Grimshaw, 113 N.J. 591, 168 Atl. 186 (1933).
14. Ibid.
15. Burdick v. Grimshaw, supra note 13, at 190.
16. Fisher v. Davidson, 271 Mo. 195, 195 S.W 1024 (1917).
17. Supra note 13, at 186.
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established by evidence that is clear, cogent, and
convincing, leaving no doubt as to their actual making
or existence.
Assuming that the natural parents and the adoptive
parents were proper parties to contract, the consideration
must be shown.18 The surrender of the child to the adoptive
parents may be adequate consideration.'9 If the child has
lived with the adoptive parents and has given them the
natural love and affection which flows from a parent-child
relationship, the court may view this action as part per-
formance and valid consideration.
20
Once these facts have been proven to the court's
satisfaction, the court may enforce the contract on two
principles of equity- specific performance or estoppel.
21
Specific performance is generally not granted until after
the death of the adoptive parents.22 The intimate and per-
sonal relationship of parent and child would ordinarily pre-
vent a court from granting specific performance during the
lifetime of the adoptive parents. 23  If the child does com-
mence his action before the death of the adoptive parents,
his action would be for damages for breach of contract and
not specfic performance. 24 The measure of damages would
be the value of the services performed by the child. 25 In
actions for specific performance, some courts apply the
equitable maxim: "that done which ought to have been
done. ' 2  By this means the court views the adoption of
the child as though completed and grants the child his
rights as a legally adopted child.27  The foregoing maxim
has been used by courts which seem compelled by public
policy to order that an adoption has occurred without any
compliance with the statutory requirements.
2
In addition to applying specific performance, the courts
18. Ray v. Klnchen, 166 Ga. 788, 144 S.E. 317 (1928).
19. In Re Biehn's Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1933) contra,
Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W 1114, 1118 (1921).
20. In Re Biehn's Estate, supra note 15, at 1115.
21. Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W 587 (Mo. 1922) Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo.
240, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1060 (1931).
22. Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 59 A.2d 499 (1948).
23. Id. at 501.
24. In Re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038, 1039 (1908).
25. Ibid.
26. In Re Schultz' Estate, 22 Ore. 350, 348 P.2d 22, 25 (1959).
27. Ibid.
28. In Re Lamfrom's Estate, 90 Ariz. 363, 368 P.2d 318 (1962).
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use the doctrine of estoppel. The estoppel arises from the
change of position of the child resulting from his reliance
on the representations made by the adoptive parents. 29 That
is, by treating the child as their own, the adoptive parents
represent that the child has been legally adopted. 3° The
Missouri Supreme Court in Holoway v Jones3 vividly
brought out the function of estoppel in the following state-
ment:
In all these cases it is held, in substance, that one
who takes a child into his home as his own, receiv-
ing the benefits accruing to him on account of that
relation, assumes the duties and burdens incident
thereto, and that where justice and good faith require
it the court will enforce the rights incident to the
statutory relation of adoption. The child having per-
formed all the duties pertaining to that relation, the
adopting parent will be estopped in equity from deny-
ing that he assumed the corresponding obligation.
A recent Texas case -3 2 presented an interesting approach to
the enforcement of a contract by estoppel. In that case,
the heirs at law of the alleged adoptive parents contended
that the intestate had been equitably adopted and, there
being no other living heirs of the intestate, they were en-
titled to share in the estate by the law of intestate succession.
The court, not being persuaded by this argument, made
this statement concerning their right to share in the estate:
the right of inheritance from the child is a
different right from that of the child to enforce the
agreement to adopt. That a legal or statutory adop-
tion, binding on all persons in accord with the statu-
tory provisions, differs from an equitable adoption,
which is based upon contract for the protection of
the child and binding on the parties or those in privity
with them, is the effect of Menees v Cowgill. 33
The Hem34 case clearly illustrates that the doctrine of equita-
ble adoption is only applied for the protection of the child
29. Cubely v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72, 80 (1934).
30. Ibid.
31. Holloway v. Jones, supra note 21, at 591.
32. Hem v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
33. Id. at page 31.
34. Supra note 32.
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and his heirs. A fortiori, it is likely that the courts would
not allow the adoptive parents to assert that a child had
been equitably adopted in order to inherit from his estate.
To hold otherwise would allow the adoptive parents to profit
from their own breach of the contract.
III. CASES REJECTING THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ADOPTION
While many courts recognize and enforce contracts to
adopt, 35 there have been cases in which the courts have
refused to do so thereby ignoring the doctrine of equitable
adoption.3 6  In 1956, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held
that their court would not specifically enforce an oral con-
tract to adopt.3 7 The court reasoned that the action was
in derrogation of the common law and was unknown to
the legal jurisprudence of Mississippi. The court went on
to say-
The question of the right of any person to base his
claim of inheritance upon an oral agreement of adop-
tion is a legislative matter, and in the absence of
legislation authorizing the enforcement of an oral
contract alleged to have been made many years
prior to the death of a property owner, the court
should not lend sanction to such a doctrine.38
In an expression of similar sentiments, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v Central Wis-
consin Trust Co. 39 made this statement concerning adoption
on equitable principles:
It is admitted by the trial court and the respondent
that the law relative to adoption has not been com-
plied with; but it is sought to cure the defect by the
application of an equitable principle. Could that be
done, statutes prescribing a procedure for adoption
would have but a shadowy force, and we could have
adoption by consent, by private agreement, by estop-
35. Benefield v. Faulkner, 248 Ala. 615, 29 So. 2d 1 (1947) Prince v. Prince,
194 Ala. 455, 69 So. 906 (1915) Snuffer v. Westbrook. 134 Kan. 793, 8 P.2d
950 (1932) Kay v. Niehaus, 298 Mo. 201, 249 S.W 625 (1923).
36. Brassel v. Brassiell, 228 Miss. 243, 87 So. 2d 699 (1956) St. Vincent's
Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W 921 (1926).
37. Brassell v. Brasslell, 228 Miss. 243, 87 So. 2d 699, 702 (1956).
38. Ibid.
39. St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. Trust Co., supra note 36, at
922.
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pel, or by any of the hundred and one cases in
which equity intervenes in private transactions. But
we have only one way of making an adoption, and
that is to follow the statute. Clear mandatory statutory
proceedings do not permit of equitable repeal.
The two foregoing decisions represent the view taken
in cases which refuse to enforce the contract to adopt. The
rationale is basically the same in both cases. The courts
simply refuse to give one adoption status unless the statu-
tory requirements have been met.
IV NORTH DAKOTA'S POSITION ON EQUITABLE
ADOPTION AND THE ADOPTION CONTRACT
North Dakota courts first mentioned a child's rights
under an agreement to adopt in 1940.40 In that case, two
persons alleged that they were the legally adopted children
of the intestate. The terms of an agreement were shown,
but no written contract was produced in evidence. The
court considered the evidence insufficient to show the terms
of any contract. The court did, however, make this state-
ment at the end of the opinion:
Our holding that the court was in error in determin-
ing the respondents were the adopted children does
not determine that the respondents have no interest
in the estate under the alleged executed contract
for adoption. The question of the right to administer
an estate and the question of an interest or share
in an estate are, in this case, two separate and distinct
matters. This decision in no way determines that
the respondents have no interest in the estate, and
therefore, this matter is left undetermined. If proof
of the executed contract to adopt is forthcoming,
then the rights of the respondents thereunder will be
determined at the time of the settlement and distribu-
tion of the estate.4 1
In the probate of the estate the respondents had proven the
execution of the contract and had been declared the sole
heirs of the decedent and entitled to letters of administra-
tion. This action was later overruled in a case which held
that the court granting the distribution of the estate had
40. Borner v. Larson, 70 N.D. 313, 293 N.W 836, 840 (1940).
41. Ibid.
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no jurisdiction over matters concerning equity, and there-
fore could not enforce the contract.42 The most recent case
concerning equitable adoption in North Dakota is a 1960
case. 43 In that case the decedent and his wife entered
into an adoption contract with an adoption agency The
agreement provided that the adoptive parents take an infant
into their custody and rear the child as their own. The
agreement also provided that the adoptive parents must
legally adopt the child before she had reached eighteen
years of age or they would be deemed to have elected to
keep the child as their own. If they elected to keep the
child, they were bound to provide for her in their will to
the amount which the child would receive had the parents
died intestate, and she had been a natural child of the
adoptive parents. The parents did not legally adopt the
child before she reached eighteen and thus, by the terms
of the agreement, elected to keep her and provide for her
in their will. The adoptive father died testate and in his
will left the residue of the estate to the child. The child
then brought an action for specific performance of the con-
tract to get her intestate share, the intestate share being of
more value than the residuary The court enforced the con-
tract by holding that the retention of the child without legally
adopting her amounted to an election to keep her and be
bound by the contract, thereby entitling her to her intestate
share.
44
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has not dealt
with a great number of cases concerning contracts to adopt,
from the foregoing decision it would seem that this court
could be categorized with the jurisdictions that do recognize
and enforce such agreements.
V CONCLUSION
Equitable adoption is a theory which arose to protect
a child's interest under a contract to adopt. The cases
indicate that the courts are not willing to grant the child
42. Mulhauser v. Becker, 70 N.D. 103, 20 N.W.2d 353 (1945).
43. Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1960).
44. Id.
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his rights under the contract unless the agreement is shown
by clear and convincing evidence. 5
It is submitted that in the final analysis the doctrine of
.equitable adoption is becoming, or has already become, the
single exception to the rule that all statutory requirements
must be substantially complied with before one is declared
to have the rights of an adopted child. The cases not fol-
lowing the equitable adoption doctrine, simply do not recog-
nize this exception.
DAVID R. BOssART
45. Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1060 (1931). For cases
holding evidence Insufficient to establish an oral contract to adopt, see Kramer
v. Cooper, 347 Ill. 293, 179 N.E. 862 (1932) and Johnston v. Eriksson, 71 S.D.
288, 23 N.W.2d 799 (1946).
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